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FORUM
In answer to the fraud and collusion argument, the
Court expressed its belief that the integrity of the adver-
sary system could not be so easily beguiled. In addition
the Court said,
[ln suits for personal injuries the issue is not only lia-
bility, as such cases assume real proportions only if
there are valid personal injuries of some magnitude.
There may be those desperate couples who would
conclude that the prospect of a substantial monetary
recovery is worth the pain of self inflicted injuries. One
can hardly imagine that the legal system will break
down with cases brought by spouses who have flung
themselves down cellar steps or permitted the other
spouse to strike them with the family car in order to
achieve the type of substantial injury that makes jury
litigation worthwhile. Id. at 342-3.
As for the insurance companies, the Court expressed
the feeling that adequate use of discovery methods
would alert them to the falsity of the claim.
In Freehe, supra, the Court discussed another answer
frequently found in the cases that refuse to allow suits in
tort between spouses:
A third reason advanced in support of maintaining the
common-law rule of disability is the suggestion that
the injured spouse has an adequate remedy through
the criminal and divorce laws. It has been observed
that neither of these alternatives actually compen-
sates for the damage done, or provides any remedy
for unintentional (negligent) torts. Id. at 774.
We are cognizant of the long standing nature of the
common law rule of interspousal tort immunity. But
we find more impelling the fundamental precept that,
absent express statutory provision or compelling pub-
lic policy, the law should not immunize tort-feasors or
deny remedy to their victims. Id. at 777.
In the future, the Court of Appeals in Maryland may
eliminate the doctrine of interspousal immunity without
reservation. The dicta in Lusby, supra, should aid greatly
in overcoming the doctrine when raised as a defense in a
negligence or less severe intentional tort injury case.
That dicta combined with the precedent of cases from
other jurisdictions, which have abolished the doctrine,
may aid the many battered wives of today's society. A
spouse should not have to wait for the occurence of an
outrageous intentional tort or have to rely on a divorce to
be compensated for losses or injuries.
POETIC LICENSE
by Jeffrey Kluger
"The Supreme Court will never entertain the notion of
tampering with the sanctity of the application and inter-
pretation of the nation's abundant crop of social idioms,
fables and popular cliches."
-Warren Earl Burger
So spoke the Chief Justice at last year's American Bar
Association convention in Kansas City. Yet less than ten
months later, the Court "tampered" indeed, and in so
doing, elected to overturn one of American culture's
hoarier, more entrenched cliches.
Pippin v. Rufo, 98 S.Ct. 653 (1979), the Court's
response to long gathering judicial storm clouds,
emerged as the linch-pin of a rapidly accelerating move-
ment designed, as one activist noted, "to overthrow the
vise-like tyranny of ancient platitudes." The case posed
the question of whether, when the going gets tough, the
tough must indeed get going.
"Not necessarily," responded the court.
The Pippin plaintiff alleged due process violations
when his tenure as a member of a semi-professional foot-
ball team was abruptly rescinded for failure to comply
with the basic tenets of the motto. The Court, finding in
favor of the plaintiff, held that "athletic exhortations are
not of such a sacred, inviolable character that they may
be exempted out-of-hand from the guarantees of the
14th amendment. Constitutional imperatives must bind
uniformly both the profound and the banal." Having thus
established the justiciability of the case, the Court
ordered the reinstatement of the aggrieved athlete based
upon the team's "wholesale failure to provide its players
with notice as to the precise moment at which the going
got tough and the requisite subsequent behavior suffi-
cient to constitute the ideal of getting going."
The ruling stunned most judicial insiders. With un-
accustomed suddenness, the Court discarded one of its
most venerable policies, spurning in a single holding two
hundred years of laissez-faire deference. "The flood-
gates are open," remarked one senior Washington advo-
cate, "now all that remains is to brave the people's cries
of 'foul.' "
Despite such dire forecasts, public response to the
Pippin initiative has been generally supportive. The Vet-
erans of Foreign Wars, electing uncharacteristically to
comply voluntarily with the spirit of the decision,
announced last week that it has designated January 1,
1981 as the formal expiration date of the public's respon-
sibility for collective recollection of the historic Alamo
conflict and promised a study to examine the feasibility of
similar action regarding The Maine, Lusitania and Pearl
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Harbor vendettas. Similarly, the American and National
Baseball Leagues, conceding the increased popularity of
competing athletic organizations, agreed jointly to aban-
don the sport's self-proclaimed status as "The Great
American Pastime," and settle instead for the less ambi-
tious but more realistic claim; "A Heckuva Way to Spend
an Afternoon."
Taking their cues from such favorable public re-
sponse, numerous legislatures have been quick to ex-
ploit the almost limitless possibilities of Pippin. Notably,
the State of Louisiana, long a motherlode of backwoods,
bayou idioms, recently approved a resolution to ascer-
tain the metric equivalent of "a stone's throw" and estab-
lish the resultant quantity as a standard unit of measure
on the state's highways. In a related action, Senator
Edward Kennedy (D. Mass) introduced legislation in the
United States Senate to clarify and define the business-
man's promise of "Thursdayish" as "that period of time
bounded by but not exceeding, 12:01 P.M. Wednesday
and 12:01 P.M. Friday."
Many legal and social scholars argue that legislation of
this nature goes beyond the original intent of the Court in
Pippin. "Cliches are one thing," asserts Japanese born
linguist Yasuo Iwaki, "but nothing in the decision indi-
cates the Justices' desire to influence the charm of
regional speech patterns or the clipped efficiency of pro-
fessional jargon. I'm frankly aghast at the public's docile
acceptance of such flagrant governmental over-
reaching."
Iwaki is apparently not alone with his misgivings and it
does appear that some limits are being sought to the
scope and application of Pippin. Leading the early dis-
cord is New York publisher Keith Marshall, owner of the
re-print rights to a large body of popular fantasy litera-
ture. Among Marshall's holdings are Rudyard Kipling's
famed Just-So Stories, enduring children's tales purport-
ing to explain the means by which various animals
acquired their unique physical characteristics. Marshall
has filed suit challenging a Pippin-inspired Federal Trade
Commission ruling requiring all future publications of
Kiplings fables to delete the "misleading and speculative"
once upon a time, and insert instead the "more com-
mercially honest" it has been postulated that. FTC offi-
cials blandly dismissed the complaint and remarked that
"a vast number of common, dangerous figures of speech
arise from Kipling-like yarns. We're merely excising the
source rather than lancing the symptom."
While the Kipling dispute has by no means kindled a
public clamor to litigate Pippin further, it has provided
encouragement for a number of suits, both supporting
and damning the ruling. Prominent among these is a
planned action by the American Federation of Television
and Radio Artists (AFTRA) to conform William Shakes-
peare's famed comedy, As You Like It, to the require-
ments of modern labor/management practices.
Principally, the group seeks declaratory and injunctive
relief requiring a revision of one of the play's better
known metaphors to read: "All the world's a stage and all
the men and women union players."
Though such extensions of Pippin can be - and are
being - freely debated, it appears that the basic premise
of the holding is sound. Citizen organizations have long
argued for judicial control of any number of simplistic
poetic bromides which too often rise to the level of man-
datory societal edicts. "It is past time," observed sociolo-
gist Kathleen Gallagher in one of Pippin's seventeen
amicus curaie briefs, "for the judiciary to assert domin-
ion over this powder-keg of an issue. Lyrical wisdom of
the type with which we're today confronted certainly has
its place. But when independent moral choices become
subordinated to the compulsory cadence of formula
ethics, it is incumbent upon the courts to wield the sickle
which slays such a serpentine menace."
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